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ABSTRACT 
The principles of Norwegian petroleum taxation create a loop of excessive currency exchange 
operations. Petroleum firms operating on the Norwegian shelf is obligated to pay tax in 
Norwegian krone. The government petroleum tax revenue is partly used to cover the non-oil 
national budget and partly invested in the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global. 
Through monthly announcements, Norges Bank discloses how much foreign currency they 
plan to buy. This paper aims to analyse to what extent, if any, the volatility increases on those 
particular days. Several models are specified to explain the daily percentage change and the 
conditional variance in the Norwegian krone – U.S. dollar market over the period 29th of 
March, 2001 to 6
th
 of May, 2013. Our findings indicate that the conditional variance was 
affected positively on announcement days prior to 1
st
 of August, 2008. The econometric 
approach involves ordinary least squares, weighted least squares and several models from the 
general autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity family.  
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1 INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Today, the principles of Norwegian petroleum taxation create a loop of excessive currency 
exchange operations. Most income from the Norwegian petroleum sector is generated in 
foreign currency, which needs to be converted to the Norwegian krone to pay tax bills. Part of 
the taxation is used to cover the non-oil budget deficit. According to a fiscal rule, this part 
cannot exceed four percent of the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global in yearly 
expenditures. The remaining part of the tax income is transferred to the Norwegian 
Government Pension Fund Global, which is invested exclusively in foreign currencies.
 1
 Thus, 
the money has to be converted once again. Consequently, the Norwegian Central Bank, 
Norges Bank, must sell significant amounts of local currency in the Norwegian money market. 
The currency exchanges are done daily, based on the monthly schedule announced by Norges 
Bank (Aamodt, 2012).  
In a letter sent to the Norwegian Ministry of Finance, November the 15
th
 2001, the Norwegian 
Oil and Gas Association requested an option to pay the Norwegian petroleum tax in foreign 
currency. On 20
th
 of December 2002, the Ministry of Finance denied the request through a 
public letter (Sollund & Lystad, 2002). In additional to the extra administration cost related to 
operating with foreign currencies, the Ministry of Finance notes the relatively low liquidity of 
the Norwegian money market. They argue that an elimination of the operations caused by the 
petroleum taxation could create wide fluctuations in the short term market.  
The purpose of this paper is to quantify what effect, if any, this extra transaction through the 
Norwegian krone has on fluctuations in the Norwegian currency market. The research is 
based on the assumption of efficient markets. Thus, the paper aims to study how the 
information provided to the market, on days when Norges Bank announces its monthly 
foreign exchange purchase plan, affects the daily fluctuations. If significantly higher volatility 
is found on those specific days, this could be an argument for encouraging or mandating firms, 
who are obliged to pay petroleum taxes, do so in foreign currency. The data applied covers 
the period from March 29
th
, 2001, when Norway officially changed their monetary policy 
from a fixed exchange regime to a floating exchange regime, to May 2013.  
Chapter 2 provides an outline of the Norwegian petroleum taxation system with a focus on the 
- perhaps unnecessary - transaction through the Norwegian money market. Chapter 3 
                                                 
1
 The Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global is managed by Norges Bank Investment Management 
(NBIM) on behalf of the Ministry of Finance.  
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discusses factors believed to affect the daily changes in the exchange rate between the 
Norwegian krone and the U.S. dollar (expressed as the Norwegian krone per U.S. dollar).  
Chapter 4 covers the econometric approach and the variables used to quantify the impact on 
fluctuation in the Norwegian money market, possibly created by Norges Bank’s monthly 
announcements. The first approach is done by a simple OLS regression of the absolute change 
in the exchange rate on the particular dates when Norges Bank announces the daily purchase 
in foreign currency for the next month. In the second approach we first attempt to create a 
model explaining the short term changes in the krone-dollar exchange rate. This is followed 
by a regression trying to explain the residuals obtained from the former model. The idea is to 
test whether the absolute residuals are significantly higher on announcement dates. This 
approach also includes a possible structural change, as the petroleum taxation system was 
updated in 2008. The final approach attempts to explain the fluctuations in the Norwegian 
currency market through the general autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity model 
family (GARCH). Chapter 5 summarizes the results and chapter 6 provides a conclusion.  
Optimally, the research could also have included other bilateral exchange rates, or indices of 
foreign currencies. Doing that would enrich the discussion. However, in this research paper, 
only the exchange rate between the Norwegian krone and U.S. dollar is analyzed.  
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2 BACKGROUND  
2.1 THE PETROLEUM TAXATION SYSTEM  
The Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) today is worth more than 4 300 
billion NOK
2
, or about 750 billion USD
3
. The total amount is invested solely in foreign 
currency. It was established in 1990, but the first transfer was not carried out until 1996.  
The GPFG is financed by the Norwegian government’s petroleum revenue, which is derived 
from three sources: the State’s Direct Financial Interest (SDFI), managed by Petro AS, 
petroleum taxes from firms operating on the Norwegian shelf
4
; and dividends from Statoil 
ASA, in which the government owns about two thirds of the shares. Government petroleum 
revenues are divided into two parts. One part is to cover the non-oil national budget deficit. 
The non-oil national budget deficit is the difference between governmental income, without 
the petroleum revenues, and governmental expenditures. The amount to be covered by 
petroleum revenues is determined by the overall economic situation on the short term and a 
fiscal rule on the long term. When the economic situation is bad, the government might have 
abnormally high expenditures and abnormally low revenues. A situation like this can be offset 
by using a larger share of the petroleum revenue. When the overall economic situation is 
bright, the government can choose to use less petroleum revenue in the national budget. In the 
long run, the fiscal policy is bound by a fiscal rule. The fiscal rule states that the non-oil 
national budget deficit should equal the expected real return from GPFG’s investments. This 
is estimated to be four percent. The second part of the government petroleum revenues are 
transferred to GPFG. The relationship can be expressed as follows (Aamodt, 
Petroleumsfondsmekanismen og Norges Banks valutakjøp til SPU, 2012): 
                                                                          
                                                                          
Taxation and dividends are paid in Norwegian krone. The petroleum tax is payable six times a 
year, on the first day of every even-numbered month. Before the first of August 2008, the tax 
was paid only two times a year. The first was paid on 1st of October in the fiscal year; the 
second was paid on 1st of April the following year. Most revenues from the petroleum sector 
are earned in foreign currency, so the petroleum firms need to change huge amounts of 
                                                 
2
 NBIM 5.9.2013 
3
 NOK/USD = 5.75, 5.9.2013  
4
 The marginal tax rate for firms operating on the Norwegian Shelf is 78 percent (Oljeskattekontoret, 2013). 
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currency to meet their obligation. Dividends from Statoil ASA are paid once a year. Since 
GPFG is solely invested in foreign currency, Norges Bank’ (on the behalf of the Ministry of 
Finance’) needs to buy foreign currency for the part that is transferred to GPFG. Norges Bank 
decides each month how much currency to buy. The amount is announced on the last business 
day of the preceding month. The purchasing is then spread evenly between every day of the 
month. Until 2012, it was not considered normal to purchase foreign currency in December. 
This was prompted by the lower liquidity in international finance markets at the end of the 
year, making it less attractive for GPFG to invest. The monthly purchase is given by the 
following model (Aamodt, 2012):  
                                                                             
                                                                        
The allocations to GPFG are affected by several factors, such as oil- and gas prices, the health 
of the economy and petroleum production. All revenues from SDFI in foreign currency are 
transferred directly to a so-called petrobuffer, as it is governmental and therefor exempt from 
taxation. Petroleum taxes, dividends from Statoil ASA and the non-oil national budget deficit 
may fluctuate. In order to reduce fluctuations in the currency purchases, the petro-buffer was 
established. As foreign currency is bought, it is transferred to this temporary account.  
The transfer from the petrobuffer to GPFG is done on the first day of every month. As the 
petrobuffer is allowed to change in size over time, the purchases and the transfers are able to 
be smoothed and do not need to deviate from what is planned. This transaction scheme is 
illustrated in figure 1 (Aamodt, 2012).  
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Figure 1: Governmental Petroleum Revenues and the Transmission to GPFG 
 
Notes: FX denotes foreign currency. The foreign currencies in the model are for illustrational purposes. 
They must therefore not be taken literally as Norges Bank and the petroleum firms are operating with 
several different currencies. Source: The Norwegian Central Bank 2013. 
 
2.2 THE OPERATIONS OF NORGES BANK 
A simplified balance sheet for Norges Bank is given in table 1. An increase in Norges Bank’s 
assets will, in isolation, increase the liquidity in the banking system through the private bank’s 
deposits in Norges Bank. An isolated increase in L1-L4 and L6-L8, without an increase in 
assets, will decrease the liquidity in the bank system (the bank’s deposits, given by L5, will 
decrease) (Flatner & Tornes, 2002). 
In a hypothetical situation where the non-oil national budget deficit is zero, the long term 
effect on the krone exchange rate due to the payment by the Norwegian krone would be zero. 
The firms operating on the Norwegian shelf would have to buy Norwegian krone in the 
currency market to meet their tax obligation. This puts pressure on the krone. The purchased 
krone is then placed as deposits in Norges Bank through a private bank. When the taxation is 
paid, there will be a withdrawal from the bank’s deposit in Norges Bank. The money is 
transferred to the account for government deposits. This will reduce the liquidity in the 
banking system. In isolation, this will put pressure on the interest rate in the money market 
and lead to an increase in the krone. Both the increase in supply for the krone and the 
reduction in the liquidity are offset when Norges Bank purchases foreign currency. Norges 
Bank purchases foreign currency from private banks. Money is therefore transferred back to 
the private bank’s deposit account, as the assets side of Norges Bank’s balance sheet increases  
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Table 1: Norges Bank’s Balance Sheet 
Assets Liabilities  
A1 Currency receivables  L1 Bills and coins 
A2 Governmental securities  L2 Governmental deposits 
A3 Loans to banks L3 Deposit for governmental securities 
A4 Other assets L4 Other public deposits 
 L5 Bank’s deposits 
 L6 Other deposits from banks 
 L7 Remaining deposits 
 L8 Other liabilities 
Notes: A simplified version of Norges Bank’s balance sheet. L5 equals the total liquidity in the banking system. 
In reality this can be seen as the overall liquidity as bills and coins constitute a relatively small part.  
 
by foreign currency. This increases the liquidity and increases the supply for krone. Both the 
original increase in the demand and the original decrease in the liquidity are therefore offset.  
However, the money market rates in Norway are controlled indirectly through a floor system.
5
 
The change in liquidity is therefore not likely to affect either the interest rate or the value of 
the krone. If the liquidity change were large enough to change the money market rates, then 
the central bank would likely offset it by supplying liquidity through another channel. 
2.3 AN UNNECESSARY CYCLE OF PURCHASES? 
The currency trading loop explained in the last subsection might seem unnecessary. The 
trading does improve the liquidity in Norwegian money markets, but the trading might create 
undesirable fluctuations in the value of the Norwegian krone, both as petroleum firms 
purchase krone and when the central bank purchases foreign currency. In the example above, 
there were no petroleum revenues used to cover the non-oil national budget deficit. The whole 
process was therefore unnecessary as petroleum revenue could have been transferred directly 
to the petrobuffer. As long as the amount used to cover the non-oil national budget deficit is 
less than fifty percent of the petroleum tax revenues, the volume of transactions would be 
reduced if the tax were collected in foreign currency and transferred directly to the petrobuffer, 
in line with the request by the Norwegian Oil and Gas Association.  
It should be mentioned that the krone is assumed to appreciate as the Norwegian government 
uses revenues made in foreign currency in the national budget. However, this paper aims to 
research the possible extra fluctuations created by the current system for petroleum taxation. 
Measuring the extra fluctuations in the krone created by the petroleum taxation system is a 
                                                 
5
 See the appendix for an illustration regarding the floor system.  
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hard task. The focus of this paper is limited to the Norges Bank’s purchase of foreign 
currency and does not analyze petroleum firms purchasing krone, even though focusing on 
both parts of the process would give more insight.  
The money markets are assumed to be efficient.
6
 In other words, the exchange rate is 
supposed to reflect all information available to the market. The money market reacts only to 
newly available information. For example, if the market knows that one week from now a 
foreign investor will buy a huge amount of krone for speculation, the krone is expected to 
appreciate immediately, as a result of the increased demand one week from now. In response 
to the expected appreciation, other investors will buy krone until there is no more profit to be 
made. The krone will therefore appreciate close to immediately after the new information 
becomes available. With this assumption, this paper will investigate the fluctuations on the 
specific days when Norges Bank announces how much foreign currency they will purchase 
the following month. A finding of significantly higher fluctuations on those particular days 
will therefore serve as an argument against the current petroleum taxation system.   
3 FACTORS DRIVING THE NORWEGIAN EXCHANGE RATE 
Currency exchange for financial purposes is far larger than currency exchanges needed for 
trading goods
7
. The exchange rate can therefore be seen as the discounted value of such 
fundamental factors as monetary policy, economic development, risk premiums, assets prices, 
the trade balance and oil prices. Formally this can be written as 
    
 
   
 ∑  
 
   
        
 
   , 
where        is the expected value of the logarithm of the future fundamental factors,   is the 
discount factor and t denotes time. In this perspective, the demand for the currency is a result 
of actual and expected returns (Aamodt, 2009). In this section of the paper, factors that affect 
the exchange rate are discussed. The variables to include in a short term model for the 
exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and the NOK are then chosen in the following chapter.  
 
                                                 
6
 See the appendix for a formal discussion about market efficiency.  
7
 Aamodt (2009) argues that purchase of foreign currency for financial purposes is about four times larger than 
foreign currency purchases for trading in goods.  
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3.2 NORWEGIAN MONETARY POLICY  
Norwegian monetary policy has historically been based on fixed exchange rate regimes. In 
1994 Norway implemented a regulation that said that the operational goal of monetary policy 
was to ensure a stable exchange rate. Even though the regulation did not formulate a specific 
interval, the general opinion was that the krone was supposed to be between 8.2 and 8.4 
against the euro
8
. Throughout 1998, there was high growth in Norwegian wages, turmoil in 
the currency market and the Norwegian krone was under speculative attacks. The key interest 
rate was increased from 3.5 percent to 8 percent, a level too high for the economic situation in 
Norway at the time. In January 1999, the central bank changed focus from exchange rates to 
inflation targeting. Even though it was still a fixed exchange regime, the change of focus did 
not violate the regulations, as the currency actually became more stable. On the 29
th
 of March, 
2001 an official target for inflation with a floating exchange rate regime was introduced. The 
inflation target was set at 2.5 percent. At the same time, the fiscal rule was introduced, stating 
that only 4 percent of the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global can be used to cover 
the national budget deficit (Thøgersen, 2011).  
The inflation target requires transparency, as the market participants need to understand the 
interest rate decision. Consequently, Norges Bank needs to create trust and transparency 
surrounding its decisions in order to convince market participants to act in line with the 
intentioned policy. In 2005 the central bank started publishing predictions about future 
interest rates. This created international attention as the central bank of New Zealand was the 
only central bank that had ever done something similar. The interest rate forecast is an 
important part of Norges Bank’s communication strategy (Thøgersen, 2011).  
As the key interest rate
9
 set by the central bank is a very short-term interest rate, it is 
expectations about future policy that affect the longer market interest rates and economic 
decisions. Since 2005, the volatility on days when the key interest rate is decided has 
decreased (Holmsen, Qvigstad, Røisland, & Solberg-Johansen, 2008).  
3.2.1 NORGES BANK’S LOSS FUNCTION 
Norwegian monetary policy follows a flexible inflation target. In practice this means that 
Norges Bank can deviate from the inflation target in favor of other factors that Norges Bank 
                                                 
8
 Before the Euro was introduced in 1999 the European Currency Unit (ECU), which is a basket of European 
currencies, was used.  
9
 The key interest rate is the interest rate banks earn on their deposits in Norges Bank overnight. 
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considers important. In general, Norges Bank follows three criteria in deciding the key 
interest rate. First, the interest rate should be set so that inflation is stable, or that a deviation 
from the inflation target is brought back to the desired level. Second, the path chosen for the 
interest rate should be balanced between inflation considerations and the path for overall 
capacity utilization in the economy. In other words, deviations from normal output need to be 
taken into account. Third, the interest rate should be set to ensure interest smoothing avoid 
deviations from what is considered a normal interest rate. Norges Bank’s loss function as of 
2012 is given by 
        
           
              
         
   , 
where    denotes inflation, y denotes output, i denotes the interest rate, t denotes time and * 
denotes the normal
10
 level or the target.     and   indicate how much detention is given to 
deviations in output, interest rate smoothing and deviations in the interest rate, respectively.
11
 
A successful interest rate is set to minimize   . The weightings inside the function and the 
function itself have been changing, and will probably also change in the future. For instance, 
the last term (regarding deviations of the interest rate from normal levels), was new in 2012, 
in order to help mitigate the risk of a build-up of financial imbalances (Evjen & Kloster, 
2012).   
3.3 THE CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT AND THE EXCHANGE RATE 
Bernanke (2005) describes the current account deficit from two perspectives. The first view 
focuses on trade flows and related payments. This is, for many countries, mostly the 
difference between exports and imports
12
. If exports are larger than imports then the nation 
will have a trade surplus and this will create higher demand for the domestic currency 
(leading to an appreciation). The second view, which Bernanke (2005) explains to be 
equivalent, focuses on investments and national savings. If the nation’s savings are higher 
than the nation’s investments, then the excess value can be transferred out of the country to a 
nation where there is need for capital. This will create a supply of currency and lead to a 
depreciation.  
                                                 
10
 A normal output implies a zero output gap, while a normal interest rate is the interest rate where the economy 
is neither pressured upwards or downwards. 
11
 Norges Bank varies the coefficient adjusted for the economic situation. For example announced Norges Bank 
in March 2012 the following coefficients:  λ = 0,75, γ = 0,25 og τ = 0,05 (Norges-Bank, 2012).  
12
The account deficit consists of export versus import, but also from payments such as dividends, interest and 
remittances. 
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Focusing on the first view, it is straightforward that prices of exported products partly 
determine the value of the Norwegian krone. A higher price of exported goods will create a 
higher demand for the domestic currency. A typical example for the Norwegian economy is 
the exports due to the petroleum sector. In the last decade the petroleum sector has been 
fluctuating around 20 percent of total gross national product (Oljeskattekontoret, 2013). A 
higher oil price is therefore assumed to have an appreciating effect on the Norwegian krone. 
Bernhardsen and Røisland (2000) find that over the period 1993 to 2000 a one percentage 
increase in the oil price appreciated the Norwegian krone by 0.02 percentages against a trade-
weighted synthetic currency, in the short run. They also find a long term solution where the 
corresponding change was 0.06 percentages.  
Focusing on the second view presented by Bernanke (2005), one could look at the oil price as 
an indicator of the attractiveness of investing in the Norwegian petroleum sector. If 
investment is increasing, then the Norwegian krone will appreciate. However, within this 
perspective it is rather important to focus on the future rather than the present. First of all, it is 
not given that today’s oil price is permanent. Second, and perhaps most importantly, the 
discounted future cash flow from the petroleum sector must be evaluated. The value of the 
unused petroleum on the Norwegian continental self is a determining factor, even though we 
can only rely on general estimates. 
Figure 2 displays the development of the oil price and the exchange rate expressed as the 
price of one U.S. dollar in krone, both series in logarithmic form, from the 6
th
 of May 1993 to 
the 6
th
 of May 2013. Ignoring other factors affecting the two series, it seems as the two series 
are negatively correlated, in line with what we could expect.   
Still focusing on investments, savings and international capital flows, the stock market may 
be a determining factor for the krone. An increase in the Norwegian stock market puts 
pressure on the demand for the Norwegian krone, directly dependent on the degree of 
international buyers. Following the same argument as for the oil, the stock market reflects 
discounted future cash flow, and is therefore an indicator of the investments done in 
Norway.
13
  
 
                                                 
13
 This argument is in line with the efficient markets hypothesis.  
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Figure 2: Oil Price Versus 
   
   
, 1993-2013 
 
3.4 PURCHASING POWER PARITY 
Purchasing power parity (PPP) claims that goods market arbitrage forces goods to have the 
same price in different countries, after converting to the same currency (Rogoff, 1996). The 
law of one price is given by       
 , where    is the domestic price of product i,   
  is the 
foreign price of product i, and S is the exchange rate expressed as the price of one unit foreign 
currency in domestic currency. It is intuitively clear that the law of one price does not hold for 
most products. For instance, Rogoff (1996) illustrates how the price of a BigMac purchased at 
McDonald’s differs across national borders. He also argues that even though there are highly 
international traded commodities, such as oil and gold, for which the law of one price holds, 
these products are rather the exceptions than the rule.   
Absolute purchasing power is given by ∑    ∑  
 , where the sums are taken over a 
consumer price index. There are especially two problems in measuring absolute purchasing 
power parity. First, and perhaps the more obvious problem, concerns which consumer price 
index to use. Consumer price indices differ across countries. Governments do not construct 
indices with an international standard.
14
 The consumption weights are shifting and new 
products are introduced (Rogoff, 1996). The second problem is due to the base year. There 
will not exist any information regarding whether PPP holds in the year chosen as the base 
                                                 
14
 There have been attempts on making an international basket of goods for comparison. However, the basket has 
proved to have number of limitations (Rogoff, 1996).  
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year for the consumer price index. If there are deviations from PPP in the base year, but the 
parity holds afterwards, this is not entirely proof of absolute power purchasing parity. Another 
scenario could be that the deviation is reversed in the period after the base year, thus PPP 
holds in the years after, but because of the base year, it will seem that the absolute purchasing 
power does not hold.  
Relative purchasing power is given by 
∑   
∑     
 
  
    
 
∑   
 
∑     
 , 
where t denotes time. Relative PPP states that a change in the exchange rate is offset by the 
change in domestic and foreign prices (Rogoff, 1996). If for instance the domestic currency 
appreciates, this needs to be offset by a fall in foreign prices relative to domestic prices.  
Throughout his article, Rogoff (1996) refers to several empirical studies that have found 
inconsistent results regarding the validity of PPP. It seems that, in the very long run, exchange 
rates and price levels tend towards PPP. However, there are deviations from PPP in the short 
run. The exchange rates are more volatile than the price levels. The price levels shift too 
slowly to keep up with exchange rate changes in the short run. In other words, inflation is 
sticky. Figure 3 shows the development in the exchange rate and the development in price 
levels between Norway and USA over the period 1961 to 2011. From the graph, it is clear that 
the exchange rate is far more volatile than the relative price level. Until 1973, there were no 
changes in the exchange rate between Norway and USA; in this period Norway was in the 
Bretton Woods regime with a fixed exchange rate to USD. During Bretton Woods, the 
Norwegian prices increased relatively to the U.S. prices, and this shows pretty clearly the lack 
of relationship suggested by PPP. As studies have trouble proving a long term relationship 
between the two series, it is pretty clear that in an attempt to estimate the daily changes in the 
exchange rate between the Norwegian krone and the U.S. dollar is not likely to be a 
successful one. In addition, inflation indices are not reported on a daily basis.  
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Figure 3: Exchange Rate and Relative Price Level in Norway versus USA, 1961-2011  
 
3.4.2 IMPORTED INFLATION 
An increase in the key interest rate will generally lead to a stronger domestic currency. As 
inflation is sticky and does not react fast, the immediate change in inflation is due to imported 
inflation. A higher currency leads to cheaper imports of foreign goods, leading directly to a 
fall in the consumer price index. Cheaper inputs to domestically produced goods lead to an 
indirect fall in the consumer price index. The inflation rate will therefore fall as a result of the 
imported deflation (Røisland & Sveen, 2006).  
3.5 INTEREST PARITY 
Covered interest parity explains the relationship between today’s exchange rate, the expected 
exchange rate in    , and the money market interest rate. In the following subsections, 
interest parity is explained through covered interest rate and uncovered interest rate. In 
covered interest rate, the investor is hedged against all risk. In uncovered interest rate, the 
formula builds on the investor’s expectations about the future exchange rate.  
3.5.1 COVERED INTEREST PARITY 
Covered interest parity implies that it is impossible to obtain arbitrage in currency exchanges. 
This can be illustrated with an example where a Norwegian investor holds one unit of foreign 
currency. There are two ways to invest that unit of currency, risk free over the period; in the 
Norwegian money market, or in the money market where the foreign currency is denominated. 
In the first alternative, the investor transfers the foreign unit to NOK in today’s spot market, 
and invests it in the Norwegian money market. At the end of the period, she will receive 
 19 
 
         
    , where    is today’s spot exchange rate and  
    is in the interest rate 
earned in the Norwegian money market. 
In the second alternative, the investor places the unit of foreign currency in the foreign money 
market. At the same time, she sells the same unit inclusive interest rates on the forward 
market. The investor will then receive             at the end of the period.  
  is the 
interest rate in the foreign money market and    is the exchange rate determined by the 
forward market.  
If there are no arbitrage opportunities, then these two options will create the same return. In 
other words: 
         
                .  
 
This can be rewritten as 
         
     
  
       . 
The difference in the money market interest rate is equal to the forward premium adjusted for 
foreign interest rate. This example ignores transaction costs (Klovland, 2012).  
3.5.2 UNCOVERED INTEREST PARITY 
With uncovered interest parity, the investor does not hedge her risk. Thus, the investment is 
not risk free. The relationship between interest rates and the exchange rates builds on actual 
and expected values. More formally, instead of using a forward agreement, the expected 
exchange,         , is used. The relationship can then be showed as  
         
           
  
       . 
There is no unambiguous belief about the value of         ; therefore it depends on each 
investor’s belief about the future, and the average of these beliefs (Klovland, 2012).  
3.5.3 IMPLICATIONS OF INTEREST PARITY 
According to uncovered interest parity, a relative increase in the Norwegian money market 
interest rate is offset by a lower expectation for Norwegian currency (a higher exchange rate, 
as the exchange rate is expressed as the price of one foreign unit in Norwegian krone). In 
other words, higher interest rates, are associated with lower expected exchange rates (Juel, 
Haarberg, & Brice, 2002). 
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3.5.4 THE LINK BETWEEN INTEREST PARITY AND PURCHASING POWER PARITY 
If inflation differences are assumed to be the basis of the market’s expectations regarding the 
future exchange rate, then the interest difference will equal the inflation difference (Juel, 
Haarberg, & Brice, 2002). With this perspective, the link between uncovered interest parity 
and relative power purchasing parity is quite clear. An increase in inflation or interest rates 
will make the krone depreciate. Both these theories are straightforward, but they both lack 
empirical evidence (Juel, Haarberg, & Brice, 2002).  
3.5.5 OVERSHOOTING 
An increase in the money market interest rate will make the Norwegian money market more 
attractive as an investment opportunity. As opposed to power purchasing parity and 
uncovered interest parity, which predict a fall in the currency, in the short term one can expect 
the krone to appreciate and then depreciate gradually. This phenomenon is called 
overshooting (Bjørnstad & Jansen, 2006). Consequently this implies that - one a daily basis - 
one could expect that an increase in the domestic interest rate, relative to foreign interest rate, 
would give an appreciation in the domestic currency.  
3.6 THE NORWEGIAN KRONE AS A SAFE HAVEN 
The Norwegian economy is strong, and has been over the last decade. The media has at times 
described the Norwegian krone as a safe haven for international investors, especially during 
the financial crisis from 2007 to 2009, and during the ongoing crisis in Europe. As early as 
2002, the Financial Times designated the Norwegian krone a “safe haven par excellence”; and 
in October of the same year, a Reuter’s survey concluded that the Norwegian krone is the best 
investment protection against currency turbulence from a possible war in Iraq. Geopolitical 
turmoil would increase the oil price and Norway has an economy that can handle a strong 
currency (Juel, Haarberg, & Brice, 2002). 
If Norwegian krone is a safe haven, one would expect the krone to appreciate as turbulence in 
the international money market increases. Flatner (2009) analyzes the Norwegian krone and 
its correlation with several indicators of financial turmoil during the financial crisis, 2007-
2009. The Norwegian krone was both argued to be a safe haven and to be the opposite. On the 
one hand, Norway has a solid financial position and is expected to manage financial crises 
relatively better than other countries. On the other hand, the krone is peripheral and liquidity 
is low (Flatner, 2009). Flatner (2009) finds no clear evidence to support either argument. 
However, he argues that liquidity of the Norwegian krone dried up too much during the fall of 
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2008, so that the Norwegian krone could not be assessed as a safe haven during the financial 
crisis. 
As suggested by Brousseau and Scacciavillani (1999), we are using the global hazard index 
(HGI) which is based on implied volatility in the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen and the euro.
 15
 
Figure 4 displays the development of the GHI and NOK/USD exchange rate over the period 
4
th
 of January 1999 to 6
th
 of May 2013. Both variables are in their logarithmic form. Even 
though there is not a clear relationship between the two series over the period, it might seem 
that they have a negative correlation in the early 2000s, but a positive correlation during the 
financial crisis (2007-2009). In other words, the relationship between the two variables seems 
ambiguous, consistent with Flatner’s (2009) findings.  
 
 
 
Figure 4: GHI and NOK/USD 04.01.1999-06.05.2013 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15
 See the appendix for a discussion and the deriving of the formula behind the global hazard index. 
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4 ECONOMETRIC APPROACH AND VARIABLES 
This section discusses the econometric approach and its accompanying variables to explain 
the daily percentage change in the exchange rate between the Norwegian krone and the U.S. 
dollar; and the impact on fluctuations possibly created by the Norges Bank monthly 
announcements.   
4.1 ECONOMETRIC APPROACH 
In this paper three approaches are adopted to measure whether the daily change in the 
exchange rate is higher on Norges Bank’s announcement dates. The first approach is simply a 
regression of the absolute daily percentage change in the exchange rate on a binary variable 
for the announcement dates.  
In the second approach a model explaining the daily percentage change in the exchange rate is 
created. The residuals from this regression are then obtained. Then the absolute values of the 
residuals are regressed on announcement dates and other possible independent variables, as 
outlined in section 3. This enables us to analyze whether the residual is conditional on a set of 
independent variables. In this approach it is important to consider whether a particular 
variable affects the exchange rate in one or the other direction, or if it is just affecting the 
absolute magnitude of a change in the exchange rate. For example, it is not clear whether 
increased global volatility drives the exchange rate to increase or decrease; however, 
increased volatility is likely to increase the absolute change in the exchange rate. If the 
variable is assumed to increase the absolute change, independent of the direction, it is used as 
an explanatory variable in the model explaining the absolute value of the residuals. If we find 
significantly larger residuals on the announcement dates, then this implies that 
announcements from Norges Bank increase the volatility in the NOK/USD market. The 
models in this approach are estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) and weighted least 
squares (WLS), since there is evidence of heteroskedasticity and WLS is more efficient in that 
case.  
In the third approach, models from the autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) 
family are used. Here we allow the variance to be conditional on former variance, in addition 
to a set of independent variables.  
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4.2 VARIABLES 
The exchange rate is expressed as the price of one U.S dollar in Norwegian krone. All 
variables except binary variables are tested for unit roots. It follows from the test statistics that 
all variables follow a random walk and are intergraded of order 1. Thus, all variables in their 
first differenced form reject the hypothesis of having a unit root.
16
 All variables are in their 
logarithmic form and in first difference. This enables us to see how a daily percentage change 
in the explanatory variables affects the daily percentage change in the exchange rate; we are 
therefore measuring the elasticity of the exchange rate with respect to the explanatory 
variables. All variables are daily observations from 28
th
 of March 2001 to 6
th
 of May 2013. 
Even though Norway officially changed to a floating regime on the 29
th
 of March 2001, the 
28
th
 of March 2001 is chosen as all variables are in first difference form. For the variable lnstl, 
which is the daily stock price for Statoil ASA, the observations go back to the 18
th
 of June 
2001. Regressions including this variable are therefore somewhat limited. All variables are 
obtained from Thomson Datastream sources: Bank of England, Norges Bank and New York 
Stock Exchange. In the following, all variables used to explain the daily percentage changes 
in the NOK/USD exchange rate, are presented. 
lnnok_usd -   
   
   
  
The exchange rate is measured as the price of one U.S dollar in Norwegian krone. The 
relationship is written as 
   
   
. The exchange rate is observed at 14.30 each day, and is the 
mid-rate between the bid and ask prices
17
.  
lneuro_usd -   
   
   
 and lnjpy_usd -   
   
   
 
While estimating a bilateral exchange rate between the Norwegian krone and the U.S. dollar, 
we want to capture changes in the exchange rate that has no direct relationship with the 
Norwegian krone (Bernhardsen & Røisland, 2000). While including the exchange rate 
between the euro and the U.S. dollar, we attempt to capture the changes in the exchange rate 
that is solely due to factors affecting the U.S. dollar. Including the exchange rate between the 
Norwegian krone and the euro would cause perfect collinearity.
18
 This is therefore avoided.  
By the same token, the exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and the yen is included in the 
model.  
                                                 
16
 See the appendix for a discussion about unit root problems and test statistic for the variables.  
17
 The exchange rate is observed 14.30 with the exception of some holidays when the exchange rate is observed 
9.45 (Norges-bank). 
18
 No arbitrage opportunities are assumed.  
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lnidiff - Interest Difference             
The interest rate differential is the logarithmic value of the three-month Norwegian money 
market rate and the logarithmic value of the three-month U.S. money market rate. Thus, the 
variable denotes the relative difference between the money market rates. According to interest 
rate parity, an isolated rise in the Norwegian money market rate will push up the Norwegian 
krone. In other words, we could expect it to have a negative coefficient on the exchange rate, 
as a decrease in the exchange rate is equivalent to appreciation for the Norwegian krone. The 
three-month rate is chosen because it is the most liquid money market rate in Norway. 
Choosing a shorter rate would potentially create a problem as the liquidity premium would 
drive the interest rate, and it might not be a good explanatory variable for changes in 
exchange rates.  
The maturity of the money market rate is longer than the frequency of the observations. This 
deals with the potential problem of relatively large changes in the daily money market rate, as 
the three-month rate also reflects the market’s expectations for the future development of the 
interest rate.  
The three-month money market rate is likely to follow the key interest rate quite closely. The 
key interest rate is set to minimize Norges Bank’s loss function (see the discussion above). 
One of the factors Norges Bank evaluates is the output gap. The exchange rate is likely to 
affect this factor, especially in a small open economy like Norway. It is therefore likely that 
the exchange rate affects the interest rate decision to some extent. In other words, the interest 
rate difference might suffer from endogenity problems as the causality is not perfectly clear. 
However, the potential problem is not likely to create large problems for the model, as the 
channel where the interest rate affects the exchange rate is much clearer than the channel 
where the exchange rate affects the interest rate. By the same token, if Norges Bank’s expects 
an appreciation of the krone, and at the same time is worried about a positive output gap as a 
consequence, they might lower the interest rate. The krone might still appreciate, but less 
severely. Situations like this will create a reverse relationship to what one might expect 
(Bernhardsen & Røisland, 2000). The relative value of the krone will also affect the 
magnitude of imported inflation. As inflation targeting is the operational goal for monetary 
policy, this might create similar problems.  
lnoil - Oil price.  
A change in the oil price is likely to change the demand for Norwegian krone. We can 
therefore expect a negative relationship between the oil price and the exchange rate (a fall in 
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the exchange rate is equivalent with an appreciation of the Norwegian krone). Over the 
research period the petroleum sector has accounted for more or less 20 percent of the total 
gross national product in Norway (Oljeskattekontoret, 2013). 
Akram (2004) suggested that the relationship between the Norwegian krone and the oil price 
need not be linear. He studied the Norwegian krone and the oil price over the period 1972 to 
1996. Even though the operational goal for Norwegian monetary policy changed several times, 
there was a fixed exchange rate regime over the whole period. Akram (2004) argues that a 
central bank which aims to stabilize the exchange rate may resist exchange rate fluctuations 
by adjusting interest rates only as long as economic shocks are within a given range. If the 
shocks are larger, then the interest rate might be too high or low and the central bank might 
find it better to let the exchange rate float. Because the oil price is very important for the 
Norwegian economy, a relationship between the Norwegian krone and the oil price can exist 
when oil prices are abnormal high or low. For example, the central bank can lower the interest 
rate when the oil price is low. Most likely, the krone will depreciate and there will be a 
relationship between the two. Akram (2004) finds that when the oil price is below 14 USD 
per barrel, the Norwegian krone is sensitive to oil price changes. When the oil price is 
between 14 and 20 USD, which was considered normal during Akram’s research period, there 
is no effect. When the oil price is above 20 USD the effect is weak and insignificant. What 
was considered a normal oil price when Akram did his research is likely not what is 
considered normal today. The normal level is likely to be far higher today (Aamodt, 2009).  
As the oil price is still important for the Norwegian economy, there might be a non-linear 
relationship between the oil price and the exchange rate also in the current floating exchange 
regime. The interest rate decisions made on the background of Norges Bank’s loss function 
reflects the oil price through the output term. We might therefore find a stronger relationship 
between the oil price and the exchange rate when the oil price is abnormal. However, the 
Norwegian three-month money market rate is included in the model, and the relationship 
caused by interest rate decisions should be picked up by this variable. This paper therefore 
assumes a linear relationship between the oil price and the exchange rate as other variables are 
expected to pick up the non-linearity.  
The oil price will also to some extent capture the willingness to invest on the Norwegian 
continental shelf. However, the stock price for Statoil ASA is included to capture investments 
in the Norwegian capital stock. Also the variable for Oslo Stock Exchange should capture 
some of this effect.  
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lnosebx - Oslo Børs Stock Exchange 
Changes in the Oslo Stock Exchange are captured by the OSEBX index and is intended to be 
a representative selection for the firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange (Oslo-Børs, 2013). 
An increase in the stock market put pressure on the Norwegian krone, both by the 
international purchases and to the extent that these were changes the investment-saving ratio 
in Norway (and thus the need for foreign capital).  
lns&p_500 – S&P500 
The S&P500 is an index representing the 500 largest companies on U.S. stock exchanges. 
Following the same argument as with Oslo Stock Exchange, an increase in S&P500 puts 
pressure on the U.S. dollar and is also an indicator of the investment-saving ratio in the U.S.  
The indices are likely to be correlated. If only one of them increases, only one of the 
currencies will be pushed upwards, while an increase in both might reflect a better economic 
situation worldwide. The latter will not be captured including only one of them.  
lnstl - Statoil ASA 
Statoil ASA is by far the largest operator on the Norwegian shelf. Statoil ASA represents 80 
percent of all oil and gas production (Gjerstad & Skard, 2013). The variable for Statoil ASA 
is chosen as a proxy for the future value of investments at the Norwegian shelf. However, 
Statoil ASA does not solely operate on the Norwegian shelf, and must therefore be treated 
with caution.  
lnghi - Volatility 
As explained above, the global hazard index (GHI) is used as a measure of international 
turbulence in the money market. The GHI is calculated using the formula above, and is based 
on the three-month implied volatility in the money market for the respective currency pairs.  
If the Norwegian krone is used as a safe haven, then the krone should appreciate if the GHI 
increases. However, the liquidity of the Norwegian krone is far less than of the U.S. dollar. As 
a result, there may be reasons to believe that the Norwegian krone depreciates during higher 
financial turmoil.   
Even though the volatility might have a positive or negative relationship with the exchange 
rate, it is assumed that volatility first of all will affect the magnitude of the daily changes in 
the exchange rate. If the market does not prefer the Norwegian krone over the U.S. dollar, or 
the other way around, then the variable should have no explanatory power in explaining the 
daily changes in the exchange rate. The variable is therefore used to explain the absolute 
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values of the residuals. In other words, some of the unexplained change in the daily exchange 
rate might be due to higher volatility in the market not captured by the model, as it has no 
clear relationship in one or the other direction on the exchange rate.  
If the real volatility was used in the model, the variable could suffer from endogenity 
problems. A higher change in the exchange rate would lead to higher volatility. There are two 
reasons for this problem not to be severe. Firstly, real volatility is not observable. The implied 
volatility is used as a proxy, and the daily change is not likely to affect the markets 
expectations for the volatility over the next three months. Secondly, the GHI index is 
calculated on the basis of the euro, the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen. More volatility 
between the U.S. dollar and the yen or the euro, or between the euro and the yen, is likely to 
increase the volatility between the Norwegian krone and the U.S. dollar as well. However, the 
problem would have been higher if the GHI also consisted of the exchange rate between the 
Norwegian krone and the U.S. dollar, or if the implied volatility between the Norwegian 
krone and the U.S. dollar was used alone.  
ann – Norges Bank’s Announcement Date for Foreign Currency Purchases 
On the last business day of every month the Norwegian Central Bank announces the daily 
purchases of foreign currency for the next month. The currency market is assumed to be 
efficient. Thus, the market should react to the announcement immediately, even though the 
actual purchases are smoothed over the next month. On the 20th of May 2003, and on the 
22th of October 2008, Norges Bank released a press release communicating that they were 
going to change the daily purchases for the rest of the respective month. The two dates are 
included in the original announcement date dummy.
19
 Before 2012, currency purchases were 
not normal for December. However, Norges Bank did purchase foreign currency in December 
in 2000, 2001 and 2002 (Norges-bank). The announcement dates in November for those years 
are therefore also included. The rest of the November dates are not included as they are 
assumed to have no information value to the market. The announcement day is expected to 
increase the volatility in the Norwegian krone. Thus, the announcement day is assumed to 
affect the absolute change in the exchange rate.  
4.3 MULTICOLLINEARITY IN THE VARIABLES 
There are two groups of the variables described above in which the link between the variables 
inside each group is strong. In one group there are the two variables for exchange rates,   
   
   
 
                                                 
19
 The actual announcement date in May 2003 is not clear, to the author’s knowledge. The 20th of May is chosen 
based on the Norwegian Central bank’s behavior in similar situations.  
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and   
   
   
. In the other group we have Oslo Stock Exchange, S&P500, Statoil ASA and oil 
price. Within both of these groups, the variables are likely to be highly correlated. These 
might create problems with multicollinearity, and make it difficult to find significant 
coefficients.
20
 
5 Methodology and Results 
In this section we describe the methodology used to quantify the possible extra fluctuations in 
NOK/USD on the specific days when Norges Bank announces next month’s purchase of 
foreign currency. The results are presented consecutively.  
Figure 5 graphs the absolute percentage change in the exchange rate expressed as the 
Norwegian Krone per U.S. dollar over the period 29
th
 of March 2001 to 6
th
 of May 2013. The 
fluctuations in the Norwegian Krone were especially high during the financial crisis, and 
seem somewhat higher in the post-financial crisis than pre-financial crisis. The average daily 
change over the period was 0.58 percent.  
Table 2 displays the average absolute percentage change in the NOK-USD exchange rate, 
given that it was an announcement date or not. The average change on announcement days is 
about 4.96 percent higher (or about 0.029 percentage points more) than other days, with 
values of 0.6094 and 0.5806 percent, respectively.  The standard error for announcement 
dates is more than four time larger than for the case of no announcement, which may be due 
to the announcement date having far fewer observations than non-announcement days. The 95 
percent confidence interval of the announcement day changes covers the entire 95 percent 
confidence interval of the non-announcement day changes. Consequently, the percentage 
change in the exchange rate on announcement dates cannot be said to be statistically different 
than for the other days.  
 
Table 2: Average Absolute Percentage Change in NOK/USD Sorted for Announcement days 
and non-announcement days 
Announcement 
date 
Observations Percentage 
Change 
Standard 
Error 
95%  
Confidence Interval 
0 2890 0.58061 0.01038 0.56026 0.60097 
1 138 0.60938 0.04939 0.51169 0.70707 
Notes: All variables scaled by 100. 
                                                 
20
 See the appendix for a description of multicollinearity.  
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Figure 5: Absolute Percentage Change in 
   
   
, 29
th
 of March 2001 – 6th of May 2013
 
5.2 A SIMPLE REGRESSION 
The econometric approach begins with a simple model where it is assumed that all factors that 
affect movements in the exchange rate, except the announcement date, cancel each other out. 
In other words, over time all factors are a part of the error term, and the error term has an 
expected value of zero. 
Table 3 displays the result from a simple regression given by: 
    
   
   
                       
    
   
   
   is the absolute value of the change from time t-1 to time t in logarithmic form of 
the exchange rate given by NOK per USD.      is a binary variable equal 1 if Norges Bank 
announces a purchase of foreign currency on day t and equals 0 otherwise. The null 
hypothesis is that the daily change in the exchange rate is not affected by whether it is an 
announcement date or not. The alternative hypothesis is that the changes in the exchange rate 
are higher on announcement dates. The hypotheses are given by         and       .  
The result indicates that the change in the exchange ratio is 0.02877
21
 percent higher on 
announcement dates. The regression cannot reject the null hypothesis on any satisfying 
significance levels. The one sided p-value for    is 0.2837. The simple regression can 
therefore not prove that the percentage change in the exchange ratio is higher on  
                                                 
21
 This is log-level model measuring the semi-elasticity. The correct equation to solve the coefficient is, 
        , (the coefficient is already scaled by 100 in table 3). Thus, the result described is approximate.  
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Table 3: Absolute Percentage Change 
   
   
 on Announcement Date 
 
    
   
   
   
     0.0288 
 (0.0503) 
  
         0.5806*** 
 (0.0104) 
N 3024 
   0.0001 
Standard errors in parentheses. All values are multiplied by 100. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
announcement days. It is also clear, and not surprising that the regression earns a r-squared of 
0.0001. The announcement date cannot explain the changes in the exchange rate at any 
practical level. This is the same result as we obtain from table 2 above, however, the 
regression is run using the robust function in STATA, and the standard errors differ slightly.  
5.3 CREATING A SHORT TERM MODEL FOR THE EXCHANGE RATE 
The simple regression above had no power in explaining changes in the exchange rate or 
revealing larger daily changes on announcement days. Now we want to find out whether the 
announcement dates causes the conditional variance to be larger on announcement dates. 
Recall from the appendix that stationary variables have constant variance. Thus, the 
unconditional variance or more intuitively, the long run variance, is constant. However, the 
stationarity requirement is not violated with varying conditional variance. As varying 
conditional variance is the same as heteroskedasticity, it violates the homoscedastic 
assumption,             , where u is the residual, X is a k-dimensional vector of the 
independent variables and    is the variance. In the presence of heteroskedasticity, the 
variance can be shown to be,                , where      is some function of the 
independent variables (Enders, 2010).  
In this sub-section we are using a two-step procedure to test whether the announcement date 
causes the conditional variance to be larger. The first step is to produce a model explaining 
the daily changes in NOK/USD. The second step is inspired by the Breusch-Pagan test for 
heteroskedasticity. The residuals from the model in step one are obtained and regressed on the 
announcement date dummy and other variables that possibly causes the conditional variance 
to vary. 
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The models suggested are represented in table 4. All models are obtained by  regressing the 
percentage change in NOK/USD on oil price (lnoil), interest difference (lnidiff), euro – U.S. 
dollar exchange rate (  
   
   
), Statoil ASA (lnstl), the GHI index (lnghi), S&P500(lns_p500 
and Osebx (lnosebx). JPY/USD was also tested, but found to be insignificant in all models. 
All significant variables are removed one by one in each model.  
 Unfortunately, data for Statoil ASA was only available from the 6
th
 of June 2001. The 
number of observations for models including Statoil ASA is therefore reduced from 3023 to 
2972. 
In all models we have included one lag for the variable s&p500 to account for the large time 
difference between the USA and Europe.
22
 All models are tested for autocorrelation through 
Durbin’s alternative statistic. The test with one lag is given by: 
 ̂                  ̂                    
where  ̂ is the residual obtained from the model we wish to test,     is the independent 
variable k and  t denotes time. This test for autocorrelation allows for the independent 
variables to be endogenous, as the variables can correlate with the lagged value of the 
obtained residual.
23
 But the test is invalid in the presence of heteroskedasticity. Thus the test 
is used with heteroskedastic robust t statistics on  ̂   . All models are tested with five lags. 
None of them exhibits autocorrelation when the heteroskedastic option in STATA is used. 
The null hypothesis is no autocorrelation. The p-values are presented in table 4 (Wooldridge, 
2009).   
The first column of table 4 displays the results from a simple OLS regression. The model 
seems to explain the daily percentage changes in NOK/USD quite well, with a R-squared of 
0.7087. This implies that the independent variables are explaining 70.87 percent of the 
changes in NOK/USD. The coefficient on the change in   
   
   
 is very significant and large in 
magnitude. A one percent change (equivalent to a depreciation of the USD to the euro) is 
estimated to appreciate the NOK with 0.95 percent with respect to the USD, and has a t-
statistic of 74.43. It is perhaps not surprising that a depreciation of USD to euro, holding all 
                                                 
22
 Variables obtained from Norwegian markets suffer from a time difference from one to two hours compared to 
variables obtained from the Bank of England. This relatively small difference is ignored in the estimations.  
23
 A simpler model without the independent variables would be invalid in the presence of endogenous variables 
(Wooldridge, 2009). 
 32 
 
other variables fixed, is highly significant and has a coefficient close to unity.
24
  The 
regression was also done without including   
   
   
 . The coefficients on all remaining 
variables did increase in magnitude to some extent. However, they still had the same signs 
and were all significant. The variable lnidiff, representing the relative difference between the 
money markets rate in Norway and USA, is significant with a coefficient of -0.0262 and a t-
statistic of -5.46. This indicates that overshooting is present. An increase of one percent in the 
global hazard index is estimated to depreciate the NOK by 0.0144 percent. This indicates that 
investors escape the NOK as international turmoil increases. Thus this is evidence against the 
NOK being a safe haven over the period. Both the oil price and the Oslo Stock Exchange 
index are significant and with the expected signs. A one percent change in oil price and Oslo 
Stock Exchange are estimated to appreciate NOK by 0.03 and 0.04 percent, respectively. The 
coefficient on S&P500 is perhaps more surprising. An increase in both the S&P500 and its 
corresponding lagged value appreciates the NOK. Intuitively, one could assume that a rise in 
S&P500 would appreciate the USD. However, we might have a problem with omitted 
variables. A possible explanation could be that the S&P500 correlates with some financial 
markets in Norway, or that an increase in the S&P500 can be associated with brighter 
economic prospects, and more investors are likely to invest in NOK (as it is already 
established that NOK behaves as the opposite of a safe haven). 
In the presence of heteroskedasticity, the OLS coefficients are not biased but an estimator 
with smaller variance exists. Also, the standard errors from the regression are incorrect and 
the test-statistics might be misleading. Heteroskedasticity is tested through the Breuch-Pragan 
test.  
 ̂ 
                               
The squared residual  ̂ 
  is obtained from the model and regressed on all independent 
variables including a constant term. Then a F-test for joint significance of the variables is 
calculated (Hill, Griffiths, & Lim, 2012). From table 4 we can see that the null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity is overwhelmingly rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis of 
heteroskedasticity. In the second column the regression is done using the heteroskedastic 
robust standard errors. This procedure only changes the standard errors in the estimation. 
However, as the coefficient on the S&P500 is not significant, even at the ten percent level, it  
                                                 
24
 If NOK/EUR is constant (and there is no arbitrage opportunities), the coefficient on EUR/USD should equal 
one. However, including NOK/EUR in the regression would cause perfect collinearity.  
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Tabel 4: Daily Percentage Changes in NOK/USD 
 OLS OLS WLS WLS 
  Robust  Robust 
D.lnoil -0.0316
***
 -0.0313
***
 -0.0298
***
 -0.0314
***
 
 (0.0040) (0.0048) (0.0043) (0.0054) 
     
D.lnidiff -0.0262
***
 -0.0262
***
 -0.0280
***
 -0.0275
**
 
 (0.0048) (0.0076) (0.0049) (0.0096) 
     
D.   
   
   
 0.9452
***
 0.9460
***
 0.9497
***
 0.9454
***
 
 (0.0127) (0.0169) (0.0134) (0.0170) 
     
D.lnghi 0.0144
***
 0.0152
***
 0.0159
***
 0.0163
**
 
 (0.0031) (0.0043) (0.0031) (0.0056) 
     
D.lns_p500 -0.0170
*
  -0.0131  
 (0.0070)  (0.0071)  
     
LD.lns_p500 -0.0311
***
 -0.0271
**
 -0.0392
***
 -0.0340
*
 
 (0.0065) (0.0096) (0.0068) (0.0134) 
     
D.lnosebx -0.0420
***
 -0.0490
***
 -0.0347
***
 -0.0527
***
 
 (0.0063) (0.0087) (0.0089) (0.0118) 
     
D.lnstl   -0.0133
*
  
   (0.0066)  
     
Constant 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
N 3023 3023 2972 3023 
   0.7087 0.7081 0.7022 0.7015 
adj. R
2
 0.7080  0.7014  
Durbin’s 
Alternative 
Statistic 
 
0.6355 
 
0.6334 
 
0.6510 
 
0.6281 
Breusch-Pagan 0.0000  0.0000  
Standard errors in parentheses: 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. Durbin’s alternative statistic for 
autocorrelation is adjusted for heteroskedasticity using STATA’s robust command with five lags. The values for 
the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity and the Durbin’s alternative statistic are their corresponding p-
values. D. indicates first difference and L. indicates lagged variable.  
is excluded from the model and the model is re-estimated. The new model is quite similar to 
the original. However, the standard errors are larger for all variables. 
In column 3 the model is estimated with weighted least squares (WLS). The method is based 
on correcting the model for some form of known heteroskedasticity. In this model there is no 
obvious form or function for heteroskasticity, and a more general approach is used. We will a 
study a flexible model where the conditional variance is given by: 
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The approach involves obtaining the residual from the model, then regressing      ̂   on all 
independent variables and obtaining the fitted values,  ̂, and calculating the weighting 
function  ̂       ̂   All terms in the original model are then divided by √ ̂ (Wooldridge, 
2009). The interoperation of the WLS estimates is the same as for OLS, as the results are re-
multiplied with the weighting function.  
Overall the WLS results do not differ largely from the OLS results. This is an indication that 
the weighting function is not far off. Statoil ASA now has a significant coefficient of -0.0133 
with a t-statistic of -2.02. Also the coefficient on the S&P500 reappears in the model, 
significant at the ten percent significance level. Also in this model, the null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity is rejected.  
Column 4 displays the result of the WLS model but with heteroskedastic robust standard 
errors. Just as before, the model is re-estimated as the S&P500 and Statoil ASA are no longer 
significant. The standard errors are higher for all variables - especially for the interest 
differential and the lagged variable for the S&P500, where the standard errors are 
approximately double compared to the non-robust WLS model. All models seem to fit the 
daily exchange rate fairly well as the R-squared is above 0.70 and does not vary much 
between the models. The variance inflation factor (VIF) is calculated for all models. It seems 
that none of the models suffer from multicollinearity with values for each variable laying in 
the interval zero to four, despite the similarities in the variables.  
5.4 EXPLAINING THE RESIDUAL 
In this sub-section a model is created to explain the conditional variance of the models created 
in the last sub-section. The residuals from each model are obtained, and the absolute values of 
the residuals are regressed on the absolute value of the same independent variables as above. 
The assumption is that, if the volatility is conditional on some of the independent variables, 
the volatility should increase whether the independent variable is increasing or decreasing. In 
addition the value for the global hazard index also appears in its regular form. It is assumed 
that a drop in the international implied volatility will lower the volatility in the exchange rate. 
Thus a drop in the index will lower the absolute value of the residual. The absolute value of 
lnghi will have a different interpretation, as it will (as above) indicate whether the NOK is a 
safe haven or not, and therefore if the volatility is conditional on investor’s preferences. The 
models also include binary variables for each day of the week and the binary variable for 
announcement days.  
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Table 5: Model for Volatility in NOK/USD 
   ̂    ̂    ̂    ̂  
 (OLS) (OLS-R) (WLS) (WLS_R) 
ann 0.000200 0.000219 0.000234 0.000192 
 (0.000255) (0.000256) (0.000259) (0.000124) 
     
Tuesday 0.000113 0.000097 0.000102 -0.000103 
 (0.000165) (0.000165) (0.000167) (0.000080) 
     
Wednesday 0.000383
*
 0.000371
*
 0.000390
*
 -0.000034 
 (0.000165) (0.000165) (0.000167) (0.000080) 
     
Thursday 0.000074 0.000061 0.000076 -0.000070 
 (0.000166) (0.000166) (0.000168) (0.000081) 
     
Friday 0.000091 0.000088 0.000081 -0.000200
*
 
 (0.000168) (0.000168) (0.000170) (0.000082) 
     
          0.015233*** 0.015089*** 0.013450*** 0.017970*** 
 (0.003690) (0.003696) (0.003725) (0.001788) 
     
            0.028758*** 0.028264*** 0.028290*** 0.006349*** 
 (0.003777) (0.003783) (0.003819) (0.001821) 
     
     
   
   
  
0.066355
***
 0.066818
***
 0.064785
***
 0.948591
***
 
 (0.012521) (0.012541) (0.012675) (0.006089) 
     
        0.005942** 0.006117** 0.005806** -0.000188 
 (0.001936) (0.001939) (0.001957) (0.000976) 
     
             0.015954** 0.016088** 0.018181**  
 (0.005938) (0.005947) (0.006021)  
     
              0.024508*** 0.024640*** 0.026612***  
 (0.005465) (0.005473) (0.005532)  
     
            0.020740*** 0.020930*** 0.018932*** 0.045865*** 
 (0.005123) (0.005131) (0.005174) (0.002345) 
     
             0.011375*** 
    (0.001316) 
     
Constant 0.001610
***
 0.001619
***
 0.001654
***
 -0.000540
***
 
 (0.000145) (0.000145) (0.000146) (0.000071) 
N 3023 3023 2972 3023 
   0.1003 0.1000 0.0983 0.9114 
adj. R
2
 0.0977 0.0964 0.0956 0.9111 
Durbin’s 
Alternative 
Statistic 
 
0.0000 
 
 
0.0000 
 
 
0.0000 
 
 
0.0052 
 
Standard errors in parentheses: 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. Durbin’s alternative statistic for 
autocorrelation is adjusted for heteroskedasticity using STATA’s robust command; the corresponding values are 
p-values for 5 lags. D. indicates first difference and L. indicates lagged variable.  
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From a first look at table 5 it is clear that the model explaining the residuals from the WLS-r 
model is ridiculous. It has an R-squared of 0.9114, suggesting that the model can explain 
91.14 percent of the volatility, which is highly unlikely. The coefficient on      
   
   
  suggest 
that a one percentage change in EUR/USD in on or the other direction increases the volatility 
by 0.95 percent. The model is clearly wrong and dropped from further analysis.  
The magnitudes of the changes of nearly all variables from the original models are significant, 
except for Statoil ASA and the absolute percentage change in the global hazard index. The 
residual from the WLS model originally includes Statoil ASA and has therefore fewer 
observations. All models can explain about ten percent of the volatility. The effect of the 
announcement date is insignificant in all specifications. In the model based on WLS, the 
announcement date raises the volatility by        percent, with a one sided p-value of 0.217.  
This result is very similar to the result obtained in the very first test of the absolute percentage 
change in NOK/USD on the announcement date. It seems that the assumption of all variables 
affecting the exchange rate canceling each other out over the period is fairly correct. The 
relatively more advanced method created so far in this paper cannot explain the 
announcement any better than the simple approach. Following Baillie and Bollerslev (1989), 
dummies for each day of the week are included. Interestingly, the volatility on Wednesday is 
higher for all models, significant at the five percent level, relative to Mondays (the base day in 
the regression). This could be explained by higher information flows to the USD market, the 
NOK market or both markets on Wednesdays. Baillie and Bollerslev (1989) argue that the 
volatility should be higher on Wednesdays as the currency transactions in USD happen on 
specific days. However, this system was prior to October 1, 1981.    
5.4.2 STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
The petroleum taxation system was changed in 2008 from a system where by petroleum taxes 
were payable twice a year to a system where petroleum taxes were payable six times a year. 
The new system is smoother as it enables petroleum firms to pay taxes more regularly 
throughout the year. This will reduce the uncertainty in the amount the firms must pay to meet 
their obligation and, more importantly, the firms will have incentives to spread their purchase 
of krone more evenly through the year. The hypothesis is that the volatility in the NOK/USD 
market is lowered as a result of this new system.  
The first payment of this tax was 1
st
 of August, 2008. A binary policy variable for the tax-
system change, ptax, equaling one for 1
st
 of August, 2008 and subsequent dates, is included in 
 37 
 
the models. In addition, interaction terms of the policy variable and all independent variables 
(except weekdays) are created. The interaction terms will measure whether the volatility is 
more elastic to absolute changes in the independent variables or to the ghi index subsequent to 
the policy change.  
Table 6 displays the results similarly to table 5 above, but with a binary variable and 
interaction terms for the policy change. Just as above, all insignificant non-binary variables 
are removed from the model. The coefficient on ptax has the expected sign in all models. The 
models null hypothesis,        , is not rejected with one sided p-values of 0.1194, 0.1029 
and 0.1061, respectively. This implies, while holding all other factors affecting volatility fixed, 
the volatility is reduced after the implementation of the system with about 0.018 percent. A 
practically small result, but significant. Interestingly, the absolute change in oil price is only 
significant after the system change. In the first column, the coefficient implies that a one 
percent change in the oil price increases the volatility by 0.028. The result from table 5 above, 
for the entire period, is 0.015. This implies that the volatility was only affected by changes in 
oil prices after August 1th, 2008. It is therefore not surprising that the coefficient is larger in 
the later model. At this point it is tempting to conclude that, as the oil price is an important 
factor in determining the amount of petroleum taxation, the petroleum firms’ activity in the 
currency market is more elastic to oil price after the system change. Even though this 
conclusion might be sensible, it is important to notice how the petroleum sector has grown 
through the period. Around 2005-2006 petroleum investment as a share of Norwegian GDP 
increased rapidly, from being somewhat steady below 20 percent in the beginnings of the 
2000’s to being steady above 30 percent after 2008 (Oljeskattekontoret, 2013). In other words, 
the oil price has grown even more important for the Norwegian economy in later years, and 
its effect on the NOK has therefore most likely grown correspondingly. 
The coefficients on the announcement days now turn out to be significant. In all models, the 
announcement days prior to the new policy, holding all other factors fixed, pushes up the 
volatility by approximately 0.07 percent, with one sided p-values of 0.0129, 0.0129 and 
0.0086, respectively. However, the interaction term, ptax_ann, tells us that the extra volatility 
is reversed after the policy change. In fact, not only did the effect on announcement days get 
reversed, but the total effect is negative. The effect of announcement days after the policy 
change is according to model one,                            percent. While it seems 
sensible that the volatility was larger on announcement days prior to the policy change, it does 
not make any intuitive sense that the announcement day has a negative effect after the policy  
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Table 6: Model for Volatility in NOK/USD with Structural Change 
   ̂    ̂    ̂  
 (OLS) (OLS-R) (WLS) 
ptax_ann -0.001463
**
 -0.001395
**
 -0.001478
**
 
 (0.000521) (0.000522) (0.000526) 
    
ann 0.000712
*
 0.000706
*
 0.000770
*
 
 (0.000316) (0.000317) (0.000323) 
    
ptax -0.000170 -0.000183 -0.000183 
 (0.000144) (0.000145) (0.000146) 
    
Tuesday 0.000114 0.000099 0.000103 
 (0.000163) (0.000164) (0.000165) 
    
Wednesday 0.000392
*
 0.000381
*
 0.000392
*
 
 (0.000164) (0.000164) (0.000165) 
    
Thursday 0.000101 0.000088 0.000090 
 (0.000165) (0.000165) (0.000166) 
    
Friday 0.000110 0.000108 0.000093 
 (0.000166) (0.000166) (0.000168) 
    
        0.006002** 0.006167** 0.006003** 
 (0.001919) (0.001922) (0.001939) 
    
            0.025375*** 0.024800*** 0.025180*** 
 (0.003771) (0.003775) (0.003811) 
    
     
   
   
  
0.056847
***
 0.056909
***
 0.054538
***
 
 (0.012487) (0.012502) (0.012660) 
    
              0.022151*** 0.022124*** 0.023743*** 
 (0.005385) (0.005391) (0.005475) 
    
ptax_          0.028142*** 0.028414*** 0.027644*** 
 (0.006063) (0.006070) (0.006264) 
    
ptax_             0.023967** 0.024952** 0.028504*** 
 (0.007951) (0.007961) (0.007508) 
    
ptax_            0.017980** 0.018046**  
 (0.006968) (0.006977)  
    
ptax_            0.013142* 
   (0.006606) 
    
Constant 0.002010
***
 0.002023
***
 0.002042
***
 
 (0.000138) (0.000138) (0.000140) 
N 3023 3023 2972 
R
2
 0.1178 0.1181 0.1156 
adj. R
2
 0.1137 0.1140 0.1114 
Durbin’s Alternative 
Statistic 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
Standard errors in parentheses: 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. ptax is a binary variable for  
structural change. Durbin’s alternative statistic for autocorrelation is adjusted for heteroskedasticity using 
STATA’s robust command; the corresponding values are p-values for 5 lags.  
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change. However, it is likely that the new tax system has allowed Norges Bank to be more 
transparent. While petroleum taxes are payable six times a year, it makes Norges Bank 
analyses for the amount to transfer to GPFG more accurate. In addition, Norges Bank has in 
general become more transparent through the period, and it is more likely that the market was 
surprised by their action in the first part of the data set. 
5.5 ALLOWING THE VARIANCE TO BE CONDITIONAL ON PREVIOUS VARIANCE 
The models above explaining the absolute residual, or the volatility, all exhibit autocorrelation. 
In table 5 and 6, we can see that none of the models passes Durbin’s alternative statistic for 
autocorrelation. In this section we will control for the possibility of the volatility being 
conditional on previous values of volatility. In other words, the variance might follow an 
autoregressive moving average (ARMA) process. The simplest form is given where the 
variance follows an MA(1) model where the variance depends on the squared term of the 
previous period.  
  
   {  
      }          
  
Where L denotes the information set available at t-1. This model is a called an autoregressive 
conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH(1))  model of order one, which was proposed by Engle 
(1982). The idea is based on the belief that a large (small) variance in one period is followed 
by a large (small) variance in the next period. In other words, the variance is conditional on 
previous variance (Verbeek, 2012). Figure 6 shows the absolute value of the residuals 
obtained from column 1 in table 4. It seems from the figure that the residuals are clustered.  
Figure 6: Absolute Residuals 
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In the previous approach, the global hazard index was used to explain the residuals. The idea 
was simple, a large upward change in global volatility would explain the larger volatility in 
the NOK. However, there is one important drawback with the model. As the ghi is a non-
stationary variable in its level form, it had to be first-differenced. A large change did indeed 
significantly increase the absolute residual. However, if the there was a large upwards change 
in ghi one particular day followed by no change in the succeeding day, then the variable 
would have no explanatory power in explaining the large residual on the second day as a 
consequence of the sustained large volatility. This pushes us towards the approach utilized in 
the sub-section, where the variance is allowed to be conditional on previous variance in the 
model.  
5.5.2 PROPERTIES OF THE ARCH MODEL 
An important property of the ARCH model is that it computes the conditional variance 
simultaneously as it computes the original model. It will therefore enable us to compute the 
model for the percentage change in NOK/USD at the same time as it computes the model for 
conditional variance for NOK/USD. In order to solve these two simultaneous equations, the 
ARCH model uses a maximum-likelihood estimation. Consider that the values of    has zero 
mean and constant variance. If we draw it from a standard normal distribution, then its 
likelihood, L, for any outcome of    will be: 
  (
 
√    
)    (
   
 
   
). 
Similarly, it can be showen that the likelihood for the joint realization of           , where T 
is the total observations, is: 
  ∏(
 
√    
)    (
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Taking the natural log of each side yields: 
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Now suppose that the residual comes from a simple model with one explanatory variable, 
          and the conditional variance is a simple MA(1) process,   
          
 . The 
model can then be expressed as: 
     
   
 
          ∑           
  
 
   
 
 
 
∑
        
 
         
 
 
   
 
The model above is an ARCH(1) model. The equation is solved by maximizing L with respect 
to   ,    and  . The first observation for    is lost because we cannot measure    (Enders, 
2010).  
5.5.3 FITTING A GARCH MODEL 
In this approach to analysing the announcement effect, we will use the original OLS model 
obtained in table 4. Figure 7 displays the autocorrelation function and the partial 
autocorrelation function of the squared residuals. It is clear from the figure that the squared 
residuals exhibit a rather large persistence. As Enders (2010, p.138) notes, it would be 
tempting to use the Box-Jenkins method to fit an autoregressive moving average (ARMA) 
model for the squared residual. The problem is that the original OLS model was estimated 
under the assumption that the conditional variance was constant. It is therefore not a good 
approach to use these estimates to compute the time varying conditional variance. Thus figure 
7 cannot reveal the precise model specification, but it is a good indicator that there exist errors 
that needs be accounted for by using the ARCH model.  
The first column of table 7 displays the results from an ARCH(1) model. The model is based 
on the OLS model for the absolute change in NOK/USD and corresponding structural change 
model explaining the absolute value of the residuals. The two models that will be estimated 
simultaneously through the maximum likelihood estimation are, 
                      , 
where    is the absolute percentage change in NOK/USD and     the explanatory variables, 
and  
  
                           
 , 
where,     refers to the independent variables explaining the conditional variance. The 
ARCH(1) term,      
 , is significant with a p-value of 0.000 implying that a one percent 
increase in the previous squared residual increases the squared residual by 0.073 percent. 
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Figure 7: Persistence in the Squared Residual 
 
Before interpreting the results, it is important to note that including one lag of squared 
variance not necessarily satisfactory in explaining the conditional variance. ARCH(q) models 
were tested for up to 20 lags. Lag 1-7,13,14 and 20 were all significant. This implies that lags 
are quite persistent over long periods. Especially troublesome is lag 13, 14 and 20. It does not 
make sense that, while the variance is conditional on the variance in the seven previous days, 
it is also conditional on the variance 13, 14 and 20 days ago, but not on the lags in between. 
As an alternative to specifying an ARCH(q) model of high order, we can specify a 
generalized ARCH model, GARCH(1,1).  In this model the variance follows an ARMA 
process given by: 
  
          
       
  
This model is equivalent to an ARCH(q) model with infinite-order of lags with geometrically 
declining lags (Verbeek, 2012). The GARCH(1,1) model is displayed in column two. We can 
see that the coefficient on     
  is 0.570 with a p-value of 0.000. This implies that a one 
percent increase in the variance two days ago will increase the current variance by        
     . For five lags the corresponding effect is 0.060. The MA-term     
  is still significant 
with approximately the same coefficient and a p-value of 0.000.  
A drawback of the GARCH model is the symmetry of the variables affecting the conditional 
variable. The change in the variables are implicitly assumed to have the same effect on the 
conditional variance whether it is a positive change or a negative change, although the 
variable ghi is included and controls for both increases and decreases in the global volatility. 
A model that allows for asymmetric effect in the variables was proposed by Nelson in 1991. 
The exponential GARCH (EGARCH) model is an extension of the GARCH(1,1) model. The 
conditional variance is given by 
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, 
If   is negative, it implies that negative shocks have larger impact on next period’s variance 
than positive shocks. As long as    , the model will be asymmetric (Verbeek, 2012). As it 
can be argued that, in some financial markets, a negative shock is followed by relatively 
larger variance the following day than is for a positive shock. Engle and Nh (1993) did indeed 
find evidence for this (Verbeek, 2012, p. 328). However, in the NOK/USD market there is no 
clear distinction between negative shocks versus positive shocks. A positive shock for 
investors holding NOK is a negative shock for investors holding USD and vice versa. In the 
NOK/USD market, a negative shock is defined by the model as a depreciation of USD. 
Column three displays the result of the EARCH model. The coefficient on 
    
    
 is 0.132 with a 
p-value of 0.000. This implies that a positive shock of one percent (a one percent depreciation 
of NOK) leads to 0.132 higher variance the following day. In line with the models estimated 
above, the NOK is the opposite of a safe haven. Investors are escaping the krone in periods of 
higher volatility. Higher volatility is more likely to influence investors holding NOK, as 
opposed to investors holding USD. The coefficient on 
      
    
 is 0.068 and the coefficient on 
      
 is 0.725 with a p-value of 0.000 for both.   
5.5.4 INTERPRETING THE GARCH MODELS 
The results from the EARCH model in column three in table 7 is similar to those obtained 
using the OLS model in column one in table 4 above. However, the variables explaining the 
conditional variance have changed. After taking into account that the variance might be 
conditional on previous variance, the variables              , ptax_         , 
ptax_             and ptax_            have all turned insignificant. The announcement 
date is significant with a coefficient of 0.380 and a p-value of 0.001. This implies that the 
conditional variance is 0.38 higher on announcement days prior to the change in taxation 
system. The coefficient on ptax_ann is -0.408 with a p-value of 0.040. The effect of the 
announcement date is therefore offset by the negative coefficient ptax_ann. For the ARCH- 
and model, the sum turns negative with about -0.3630, which once again is counterintuitive. It 
seems like Norges Bank caused the market to be more volatile due to the disclosure of their 
purchase plan, but only prior to the change in the petroleum tax-system. The coefficient on 
The coefficient on      
   
   
  is very high relatively to the other variables, this is not  
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Table 7: Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity Models 
    
   
   
 
ARCH(1) GARCH(1,1) EARCH(1,1) 
    
D.lnoil -0.024500
***
 -0.025103
***
 -0.025801
***
 
 (0.003465) (0.003520) (0.003467) 
    
D.lnidiff -0.034638
***
 -0.031323
***
 -0.031176
***
 
 (0.006802) (0.005911) (0.006020) 
    
D.   
   
   
 0.934177
***
 0.944871
***
 0.946840
***
 
 (0.012908) (0.012529) (0.012317) 
    
D.lnghi 0.012752
***
 0.014053
***
 0.013795
***
 
 (0.003110) (0.003204) (0.003186) 
    
D.lns_p500 -0.014729
*
 -0.014350
*
 -0.013995
*
 
 (0.007293) (0.007288) (0.007069) 
    
LD.lns_p500 -0.026708
***
 -0.024115
***
 -0.023863
***
 
 (0.006919) (0.006844) (0.006764) 
    
D.lnosebx -0.032274
***
 -0.033356
***
 -0.030683
***
 
 (0.006140) (0.006116) (0.005967) 
    
D.lnstl -0.000044 -0.000042 -0.000016 
 (0.000070) (0.000069) (0.000068) 
HET    
ptax_ann -0.785212
**
 -0.708331 -0.407656
*
 
 (0.254343) (0.452875) (0.198439) 
    
ann 0.422231
**
 0.744453
***
 0.380108
**
 
 (0.156379) (0.214331) (0.116712) 
    
ptax 0.060011 -0.093341 -0.032336 
 (0.060658) (0.083412) (0.030134) 
    
Tuesday 0.138616 0.661698
**
 0.244445
*
 
 (0.074280) (0.243594) (0.096102) 
    
Wednesday 0.348167
***
 0.738561
***
 0.269265
**
 
 (0.075105) (0.209342) (0.083907) 
    
Thursday 0.120926 0.002987 -0.018815 
 (0.074085) (0.269533) (0.082878) 
    
Friday 0.088814 0.386966 0.060479 
 (0.078273) (0.278826) (0.097532) 
    
        4.727521*** 5.381810** 3.454180*** 
 (0.926653) (1.646854) (0.675669) 
    
            13.587490*** 13.501691*** 5.956510*** 
 (1.949123) (2.435399) (1.419676) 
    
     
   
   
  
36.339747
*** 
(5.796114) 
48.689106
*** 
(9.220661) 
22.547642
*** 
(4.570948) 
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Table 7 (Continued)    
              9.818246*** 5.008856 0.791645 
 (2.512328) (4.693531) (1.886640) 
    
ptax_          7.382923* 14.902840** 3.785771 
 (3.076406) (4.766351) (2.014272) 
    
ptax_             14.789726*** 9.877048 2.709201 
 (4.142777) (6.518360) (2.813182) 
    
ptax_            7.682700** 7.458562 3.116880 
 (2.830553) (5.690218) (2.320505) 
    
Constant -11.841618
***
 -13.123058
***
 -3.380452
***
 
 (0.066720) (0.232100) (0.432250) 
ARCH    
    
 
 0.073027
***
 0.071534
***
  
 (0.016507) (0.015151)  
    
      
 
  0.569836
***
  
  (0.049933)  
    
      
    
 
  0.067988
*** 
(0.018273) 
    
    
    
 
  0.131609
*** 
(0.028419) 
    
      
 
   0.724731
***
 
   (0.036103) 
N 3023 3023 3023 
 Standard errors in parentheses: 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
surprising. A one percent change in the EUR/USD market is quit server. Thus, it should 
increase the variance in the NOK/USD market quite drastically. 
6 CONCLUSION 
In this paper it has been argued that the current petroleum taxation system creates an 
unnecessary cycle of purchases through foreign currencies. There has been done an empirical 
analyze over the period from March 29
th
, 2001 to May 6
th
, 2013. The emphasis has been on 
whether Norges Bank affects the volatility in the Norwegian krone – U.S. dollar market 
through announcements of their monthly purchase plan of foreign currency. Over the period 
as a whole, there is no evidence of higher volatility on those particular days. By including a 
structural change in the model, to account for the change in the petroleum tax system August 
2008, we find a significantly larger volatility on the announcement days prior to the system 
change. However, another important factor, not picked up by the model, is the increased 
transparency in Norges Bank’s operating market decisions through the period. The empirical 
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research has revealed several important variables that affect the conditional variance in the 
Norwegian krone – U.S. dollar market. In comparison with these variables, the 
announcements prior to the structural change cannot be said to have been an important driver 
for volatility.  
Even though the principles for the Norwegian petroleum taxation system create excessive 
currency operations, the research done in this paper does not provide evidence to support a 
change in the current system. On the contrary, it is likely that the excessive currency 
transactions help maintain liquidity of the Norwegian krone, and lower the overall volatility.  
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APPENDIX 
A.1 EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS 
With efficient markets; all prices reflect all relevant information. Fama (1970, 1976) defines 
three types of efficiency, depending on what information that is understood to be relevant. 
Weak-form efficiency says that information about historical prices is not useful in making 
excess return. In other words, one cannot develop trading rules based on historical prices and 
returns in capital markets. Semistrong-form efficiency states that no investor can make excess 
return based on any publicly available information. All prices reflect all publicly available 
information. Strong-form efficiency states that no investor can earn excess return using any 
information, publicly or not. With this form of efficiency, not even insiders are able to earn 
abnormal returns (Copeland, Weston, & Shastri, 2005). In this paper, semistrong-form 
efficiency is assumed. Therefore, as Norges Bank announces new information, this will 
impact the prices of the Norwegian krone. With the strong assumption, the market would not 
react to the announcement, because the information would already been reflected by the 
prices, even though the information was not publicly available.  
A.1.2 THE VALUE OF INFORMATION 
The value of an information structure can be expressed as 
     ∑      
   
 
∑                    . 
g(m) is the prior probability for receiving message m, p(e|m) is the conditional probability of 
event e, given message m, U(a,e), is the utility from action a if event e occurs,       is the 
expected utility of the decision maker without the information (Copeland, Weston, & Shastri, 
2005). The value of the Norwegian krone will therefore depend on the likelihood of receiving 
information, the likelihood of each particular event given that information, and the utility of 
the actions given those events, and of course, adjusted for the utility given no new 
information available. An important aspect of this formula, regarding this paper, is the 
probability for the announcement to be as the market anticipates. For example, if the market 
expects the announcement to be a 200 million daily purchase of foreign currency with a 
probability of 90 percent, and the announcement is as expected, the value of the Norwegian 
krone will not adjust much as opposed to an announcement which surprises the market. It is 
likely that for many of the announcement days, the market has already guessed the 
announcement, and the effect will be relatively small.  
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A.2 THE FLOOR SYSTEM 
The liquidity policy is executed in order to implement the monetary decisions. The most 
common framework for liquidity policy is through a corridor system. In a corridor system the 
central bank offers two overnight facilities; a deposit rate and a lending rate. No bank is 
willing to lend money to another bank in the interbank market at a lower rate than the deposit 
rate offered overnight in the central bank. Similarly, banks will not loan to a rate higher than 
the lending rate offered by the central bank, as long as the bank is eligible for loans at the 
central bank
25
. The key rate determined by the central bank’s monetary policy is normally in 
the middle of the deposit rate and the lending rate in a corridor system. The central bank is 
using supply and demand of liquidity in the banking system to adjust the overnight interbank 
money market rate, to be close to the key rate (Bernhardsen & Kloster, 2010). 
Norges Bank is using a so-called floor system. An advantage of the floor system is its 
capability to distinguish the liquidity policy and the monetary policy. As the liquidity drained 
during the financial crisis (2007-2009), this was beneficial. The construction of a floor system 
is the same as the corridor system, with the same facilities offered by the central bank. 
However, in the floor system, the liquidity provided by the central bank is large enough for 
the interbank interest rate to approach the deposit rate. In other words, the deposit rate is set 
equal to the key interest rate. The floor system does have a drawback. The banks inside the 
system do not have as much incentives to trade with each other. The supply side of loans 
might dry up, as banks having excess liquidity might choose to use the deposit facility in the 
central bank opposed to lending out the excess liquidity in the interbank money market 
(Keister, Martin, & McAndrews, 2008). On October 3th, 2011, Norges Bank extended the 
liquidity system (Syrstad, 2012). The extended version of the floor system provides each bank 
with a limit of how much capital they are eligible placing at the deposit rate. The excess 
capital above this limit earns a rate lower than the deposit rate, called the reserve rate. This 
provides banks incentives to lend out excessive capital in the interbank money market. Norges 
Bank separates the deposit facility and the lending facility by one percentage point. The 
reserve rate is one percentage point lower than the deposit rate.  
A.3 IMPLIED VOLATILITY AND THE GLOBAL HAZARD INDEX 
Volatility is an unobservable value. Thus, a proxy for volatility is needed. Historical volatility 
does not live up to the task, as current and future volatility is not dependent upon former 
                                                 
25
 Banks need to provide collateral in order to use the central bank’s lending facility. In addition, not all banks 
are eligible for the facility, such as foreign banks operating in Norway.  
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volatility (McDonald, 2006). An alternative is to use the implied volatility obtained directly 
from the derivative market. Implied volatility is obtained by observing the options prices on 
the underlying asset of interest. The Black & Scholes formula is frequently used to calculate 
the implied volatility. For a European call option, the Black & Scholes becomes what is called 
the Garman-Kohlhagen model: 
                
         
   
  
 
  (     
 
  
 )  
 √ 
 
       √  
c, is the call price, x is the current exchange rate (domestic currency per unit of foreign 
currency), K is the strike price, r and    are domestic and foreign interest rate,   is the 
volatility, T denotes time and      is the cumulative normal distribution function (McDonald, 
2006). All the inputs except volatility are easily observed directly from the market. Volatility 
can be found by solving the formula for  . The implied volatility reflects the markets belief 
about the volatility. An option is more valuable when fluctuations are large. The higher the 
option price is, all else equal, the higher is the implied volatility. In other words, when market 
participations believe that there is a lot uncertainty in the market, they will price an option to 
buy or sell a future asset for a given price higher. The formula above can easily be extended to 
a European put option.  
Brousseau and Scacciavillani (1999) suggested that a relevant indicator for international 
money market turbulence can be formed by the implied volatilities of the exchange rates 
among the dollar, the euro and the yen
26
. The global hazard index (GHI) is given by: 
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, 
   
   
 and 
    
   
, respectively (Brousseau & Scacciavillani, 1999). 
The formula is an expression of an orthocenter. Figure 8 illustrates this. The lines between the 
pars of currencies, in the figure, implicate the implied volatility in between them. In the 
illustration, the implied volatilities between the pars are at the same level. Thus, the lines are 
of equal length. The diameter of the circle is equal the orthocenter which is equal GHI. The  
                                                 
26
 When Brousseau and Scacciavillani (1999) published their paper, they suggested using the German mark.  
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Figure 8: Orthocenter 
 
Notes: Figure obtained from Bernhardsen and Røisland (2000) 
average implied volatility equal a third of the circumference of the triangle. The GHI is larger 
than the mean implied volatility. If the implied volatility off for example 
   
   
 is very low, the 
average volatility would be reduced by far. However, the GHI will not be reduced as much. 
The GHI will be close to the implied volatility between USD and EUR. This will reflect the 
international uncertainty. If we follow the same example, but Japan ties their currency to the 
dollar, the average implied volatility will increase by far, while the GHI will be reduced 
marginally (depending on the initial implied volatility between JPY and USD) (Bernhardsen 
& Røisland, 2000). 
A.4 SPURIOUS REGRESSIONS 
A.4.1 STATIONARITY 
A variable is strictly stationary if its properties are not affected over time. In other words, the 
joint probability distribution is not changed over time. For a weakly stationary variable, only 
the mean, variance and the covariance are needed to be independent of time (Verbeek, 2012).  
For instance, take the Oslo Stock Exchange index osebx. If the stock market is efficient, then 
the value of the index will represent all available information to the market. Changes to the 
index will occur only as new information becomes available. This can be written as a random 
walk model,                    . Today’s value of osebx equals yesterday’s value of 
osebx plus any newly available information to the market given by   . Thus,    . Assuming 
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efficient markets and that any new information is at random,        , then it can be showed 
that the variance of osebx increase linearly over time 
                                      
  . 
If          , the correlation between    and       is given by               √
 
   
. The 
covariance is not stationary as, the covariance between two points with the same distance in 
between increases as t increases. The constant mean requirement is violated if osebx follows 
any trend. If osebx can be described by these properties, we can conclude that osebx is 
following a random walk and is non-stationary.  
A.4.2 DEFINITION OF SPURIOUS REGRESSION 
A spurious regression problem has its origin from a situation where two variables are 
correlated through their correlation with a third variable (Wooldridge, 2009). When dealing 
with two independent series that are both integrated of order one, the situation is more 
complicated. Even though the series have means without trends, the relationship between the 
two will often be significant. Granger and Newbold (1974) showed this through a regression 
of one variable integrated of order one on another variable integrated of order one, using 
ordinary least squares. They showed, by doing this, that a large percentage of the time the t-
statistic was significant far more often than one could expect. Granger and Newbold (1974) 
called this the spurious regression problem. Davidson and MacKinnon showed that with a 
sample size of 50, the null hypothesis was rejected against the five percentage level about 
66.2 percent of the time. The problem even got more severe when the sample size increased 
(Wooldridge, 2009).  
If the residual follows a random walk, then the t-statistic does not have an asymptotic normal 
distribution (Verbeek, 2012). More formally it can be showed that the residual from a 
regression of one variable on the other follows a random walk. The two I(1) variables can be 
written as            and           . The regression can then be written as 
             . 
The residual needs to have zero mean,        , for the t-statistic for the estimated 
coefficient on x,  ̂  to be asymptotically normally distributed for large samples. The null 
hypothesis is given by       . Since the two variables are independent, the null should 
hold. We can then rewrite the equation as         . For    to hold, firstly    needs to 
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equal 0, but more importantly if       ∑   
 
   .Then the residual, u, follows a random 
walk (Wooldridge, 2009). 
A.4.3 TESTING FOR UNIT ROOTS 
In order to formally test whether a variable is stationary or not, we can test for unit roots. We 
insert the variable we want to test in an autoregressive model of order one (AR(1)),      
                 , where    is the initial value of the variable.    is assumed to be 
independent identically distributed with zero mean and is independent of    (Wooldridge, 
2009). If     the variable has a unit root. Thus, it follows a random walk and is non-
stationary. If, then in addition,    , the variable follows a random walk with a drift. We can 
now test whether    . We test the null hypothesis,       , against the alternative 
hypothesis,       . When      ,    is a stable AR(1) process. By subtracting      from 
both sides of the AR(1) equation we obtain 
              . 
Where       . It is now straightforward to test        against      . A rejection 
of the null hypothesis implies that the variable y does not follow a random walk. If we keep 
the null hypothesis, the variable is an I(1) process and, as stated above, we cannot use the 
central limit theorem. Thus the t-statistic does not have an asymptotic standard normal 
distribution even for large samples. However, we can use the t-statistics, but they have to be 
compared with adjusted critical values. These critical values were first obtained by Dickey 
and Fuller (1979), and the test is called the Dickey-Fuller (DF) test (Wooldridge, 2009). 
The test can easily be extended to include a time trend or to include lags of    . The latter is 
called an augmented Dickey-Fuller test. By including both a time trend and lags, the model 
will can be expressed as 
                              , 
where    refers to the time trend. When including these terms, the critical values for the t-
statistic change (Wooldridge, 2009).  
Table 8 below displays the results of a Dickey-Fuller unit root test on all variables in their 
level form. All variables do have unit roots for all lag options on the five percentage 
significance level. The maximum number of lags included in the test is determined by the 
Schwert criterion. Table 9 displays the results after taking first difference of the variables, 
with exception of Δ  
   
   
, all variables passes the test for all lags, and reject the null 
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hypothesis of having unit roots. Δ  
   
   
 does not reject the null hypothesis on the five 
percentage significance level for 26, 27 and 28 lags. As it rejects a unit root for all other lags, 
the variable is used in the analysis.  
A.5 MULTICOLLINEARITY 
In a regression with highly correlated explanatory variables, we may experience 
multicollinearity problems. Multicollinearity drives up the variance of the coefficients, and 
might create problems establishing significant coefficients. The sample variance of the 
coefficients  ̂  is given by 
   ( ̂ )  
  
         
  
, 
   is the error variance and represent white noise.      is the total sample variation in 
variable j.   
  is the R-squared of a regression of j on all other explanatory variables. Thus it 
explains how much of the variation in j that can be explained by the other explanatory 
variables. It is clear from the formula above that a higher   
  will increase the variance of the 
coefficient  ̂ . Wit   
  equal one, the regression will suffer from perfect collinearity and the 
regression is not valid (Wooldridge, 2009). 
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Table 8: Dickey-Fuller test for stationarity 
Lags 
  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
                                                 Critical Values 
           1 % 5 % 10 % 
28 -1.626 -1.212 -1.766 1.781 -1.779 -1.388 -2.795 -1.056 -1.926  -3.480 -2.832 -2.545 
27 -1.612 -1.217 -1.767 1.714 -1.723 -1.320 -2.723 -1.007 -1.941 -1.832 -3.480 -2.833 -2.546 
26 -1.609 -1.212 -1.680 1.734 -1.719 -1.380 -2.750 -0.987 -1.989 -1.923 -3.480 -2.833 -2.546 
25 -1.572 -1.211 -1.668 1.668 -1.713 -1.302 -2.607 -0.989 -1.932 -1.903 -3.480 -2.833 -2.547 
24 -1.581 -1.221 -1.653 1.658 -1.736 -1.336 -2.593 -1.008 -2.040 -1.886 -3.480 -2.834 -2.547 
23 -1.578 -1.259 -1.720 1.716 -1.811 -1.374 -2.626 -1.021 -2.166 -1.857 -3.480 -2.834 -2.547 
22 -1.579 -1.225 -1.749 1.725 -1.802 -1.361 -2.641 -1.044 -2.208 -1.816 -3.480 -2.835 -2.548 
21 -1.647 -1.282 -1.781 1.728 -1.758 -1.366 -2.746 -1.048 -2.212 -1.769 -3.480 -2.835 -2.548 
20 -1.651 -1.356 -1.756 1.681 -1.751 -1.345 -2.770 -1.042 -2.231 -1.782 -3.480 -2.836 -2.549 
19 -1.599 -1.326 -1.723 1.721 -1.745 -1.378 -2.750 -1.028 -2.252 -1.762 -3.480 -2.836 -2.549 
18 -1.675 -1.363 -1.733 1.700 -1.762 -1.319 -2.729 -1.021 -2.247 -1.767 -3.480 -2.837 -2.550 
17 -1.707 -1.334 -1.757 1.718 -1.865 -1.347 -2.658 -0.994 -2.298 -1.801 -3.480 -2.837 -2.550 
16 -1.609 -1.266 -1.711 1.638 -1.778 -1.341 -2.707 -0.983 -2.219 -1.837 -3.480 -2.838 -2.550 
15 -1.604 -1.255 -1.711 1.554 -1.712 -1.300 -2.714 -1.008 -2.143 -1.691 -3.480 -2.838 -2.551 
14 -1.541 -1.206 -1.776 1.540 -1.772 -1.349 -2.644 -1.027 -2.090 -1.636 -3.480 -2.839 -2.551 
13 -1.520 -1.175 -1.813 1.546 -1.809 -1.386 -2.511 -1.024 -1.971 -1.565 -3.480 -2.839 -2.552 
12 -1.561 -1.200 -1.734 1.503 -1.752 -1.404 -2.402 -0.998 -1.945 -1.533 -3.480 -2.840 -2.552 
11 -1.534 -1.129 -1.711 1.532 -1.781 -1.462 -2.456 -0.966 -1.935 -1.460 -3.480 -2.840 -2.552 
10 -1.512 -1.118 -1.748 1.561 -1.758 -1.528 -2.413 -0.951 -1.918 -1.512 -3.480 -2.840 -2.553 
9 -1.488 -1.139 -1.653 1.522 -1.727 -1.501 -2.345 -0.924 -1.862 -1.428 -3.480 -2.841 -2.553 
8 -1.570 -1.183 -1.615 1.515 -1.736 -1.502 -2.332 -0.907 -1.929 -1.503 -3.480 -2.841 -2.554 
7 -1.555 -1.121 -1.655 1.487 -1.653 -1.504 -2.426 -0.882 -1.949 -1.573 -3.480 -2.842 -2.554 
6 -1.520 -1.052 -1.655 1.421 -1.695 -1.493 -2.404 -0.830 -1.987 -1.685 -3.480 -2.842 -2.554 
5 -1.572 -1.088 -1.766 1.454 -1.741 -1.546 -2.467 -0.755 -2.057 -1.785 -3.480 -2.843 -2.555 
4 -1.620 -1.108 -1.719 1.512 -1.809 -1.607 -2.503 -0.713 -2.120 -1.856 -3.480 -2.843 -2.555 
3 -1.606 -1.058 -1.713 1.486 -1.847 -1.616 -2.438 -0.676 -2.164 -1.856 -3.480 -2.843 -2.556 
2 -1.619 -1.060 -1.737 1.522 -1.817 -1.673 -2.428 -0.635 -2.219 -1.916 -3.480 -2.844 -2.556 
1 -1.702 -1.095 -1.807 1.554 -1.962 -1.800 -2.374 -0.572 -2.229 -1.998 -3.480 -2.844 -2.556 
Notes: The t-distribution is marginally different for lnvol. However, using the absolute correct critical values does not change the interpretation.  
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Table 9: Dickey-Fuller test for Stationarity, First Difference 
Lags Δ  
   
   
 Δ  
   
   
 Δ  
   
   
                                l                        Critical Values 
           1 % 5 % 10 % 
28 -4.675 -3.074 -2.541 -8.310 -7.028 -4.237 -9.230 -6.694 -7.750  -3.480 -2.832 -2.545 
27 -4.902 -3.129 -2.618 -8.729 -7.399 -4.453 -9.557 -7.150 -7.834 -5.313 -3.480 -2.833 -2.546 
26 -5.084 -3.212 -2.689 -9.225 -7.797 -4.768 -9.954 -7.612 -8.016 -5.661 -3.480 -2.833 -2.546 
25 -5.253 -3.319 -2.860 -9.272 -8.035 -4.772 -10.015 -7.898 -8.078 -5.589 -3.480 -2.833 -2.547 
24 -5.528 -3.426 -2.967 -9.825 -8.295 -5.164 -10.733 -8.039 -8.571 -5.787 -3.480 -2.834 -2.547 
23 -5.696 -3.524 -3.090 -10.079 -8.452 -5.264 -10.997 -8.046 -8.401 -5.991 -3.480 -2.834 -2.547 
22 -5.915 -3.581 -3.117 -9.930 -8.416 -5.359 -11.073 -8.104 -8.177 -6.243 -3.480 -2.835 -2.548 
21 -6.138 -3.771 -3.197 -10.073 -8.705 -5.622 -11.234 -8.082 -8.259 -6.552 -3.480 -2.835 -2.548 
20 -6.160 -3.804 -3.279 -10.263 -9.168 -5.852 -11.030 -8.206 -8.482 -6.910 -3.480 -2.836 -2.549 
19 -6.388 -3.804 -3.440 -10.782 -9.513 -6.205 -11.157 -8.411 -8.663 -7.116 -3.480 -2.836 -2.549 
18 -6.831 -4.004 -3.635 -10.772 -9.895 -6.389 -11.465 -8.698 -8.844 -7.442 -3.480 -2.837 -2.550 
17 -6.859 -4.082 -3.786 -11.165 -10.195 -6.974 -11.803 -8.943 -9.142 -7.718 -3.480 -2.837 -2.550 
16 -7.039 -4.306 -3.932 -11.311 -10.082 -7.260 -12.407 -9.379 -9.233 -7.911 -3.480 -2.838 -2.550 
15 -7.731 -4.655 -4.214 -12.197 -10.933 -7.740 -12.498 -9.708 -9.877 -8.110 -3.480 -2.838 -2.551 
14 -8.155 -4.917 -4.461 -13.278 -11.817 -8.488 -12.796 -9.714 -10.612 -9.019 -3.480 -2.839 -2.551 
13 -8.913 -5.328 -4.608 -13.878 -12.031 -8.858 -13.502 -9.787 -11.346 -9.732 -3.480 -2.839 -2.552 
12 -9.584 -5.755 -4.824 -14.349 -12.395 -9.332 -14.667 -10.061 -12.627 -10.657 -3.480 -2.840 -2.552 
11 -10.011 -6.050 -5.331 -15.402 -13.426 -9.994 -15.917 -10.597 -13.538 -11.546 -3.480 -2.840 -2.552 
10 -10.885 -6.758 -5.813 -15.801 -14.004 -10.492 -16.257 -11.261 -14.479 -12.900 -3.480 -2.840 -2.553 
9 -11.902 -7.371 -6.212 -16.234 -15.070 -10.986 -17.325 -11.817 -15.649 -13.658 -3.480 -2.841 -2.553 
8 -13.160 -7.948 -7.092 -17.570 -16.418 -12.207 -18.814 -12.596 -17.463 -15.650 -3.480 -2.841 -2.554 
7 -13.833 -8.502 -8.050 -18.733 -17.656 -13.513 -20.158 -13.344 -18.401 -16.759 -3.480 -2.842 -2.554 
6 -15.424 -9.772 -8.966 -20.481 -20.221 -15.142 -20.764 -14.320 -20.050 -18.141 -3.480 -2.842 -2.554 
5 -17.684 -11.544 -10.342 -23.436 -22.022 -17.414 -22.668 -15.999 -21.903 -19.405 -3.480 -2.843 -2.555 
4 -19.699 -13.108 -11.540 -25.351 -24.274 -19.650 -24.166 -18.728 -23.855 -21.097 -3.480 -2.843 -2.555 
3 -22.402 -15.366 -14.200 -27.377 -26.992 -22.568 -26.474 -21.579 -26.534 -23.664 -3.480 -2.843 -2.556 
2 -27.315 -19.653 -18.083 -32.576 -31.483 -27.822 -31.234 -25.497 -30.742 -28.457 -3.480 -2.844 -2.556 
1 -35.201 -26.378 -24.677 -39.313 -41.191 -35.911 -38.245 -31.925 -37.434 -35.601 -3.480 -2.844 -2.556 
Notes: The t-distribution is marginally different for Δlnvol, as the shwerz criterion suggest 27 lags. Using the correct critical values does not change the interpretation. 
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